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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * 
DAWN ALUMBAUGHf : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. : 
UTAH STATE INSURANCE : 
DEPARTMENT, by and through 
its Commissioner and : Case No, 920656-CA 
Authorized Representative, 
HAROLD C. YANCEY, : Category No. 15 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this Appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(j). This case 
was assigned to the Court of Appeals by Order of the Utah Supreme 
Court, dated October 16, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was Alumbaugh required to exhaust her remedies under the 
Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act prior to bringing her 
claims for violation of Federal and State Due Process and breach 
of contract? 
This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore, 
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review, 
St, Benedict's Dev. Co, v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P. 2d 
194 (Utah 1991). 
2. Is Alumbaugh excused from exhausting her remedies under 
the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act due to the futility of 
such remedies? 
This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore, 
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review. Id. 
3. Did Alumbaugh adequately exhaust her remedies under the 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act? 
This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore, 
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review. Id. 
4. Has Alumbaugh sufficiently stated a claim for violation 
of Federal Due Process under 42 USC Section 1983? 
This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore, 
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review. Id. 
5. Has Alumbaugh sufficiently stated a claim for violation 
of Due Process under the Utah Constitution? 
This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore, 
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review. Id. 
6. Has Alumbaugh sufficiently stated a claim for breach of 
an implied contract of employment? 
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This issue is purely legal in nature and is# therefore, 
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Alumbaugh submits that the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes and rules are determinative of certain 
issues in this Appeal. Due to their length, such authorities are 
set forth verbatim within the Addendum hereto, at pages 1-13: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7. 
UCA Section 67-19a-101 to 67-19a-408. 
Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Alumbaugh alleges in this action that she was involuntarily 
transferred from her job position within the Solvency Division of 
the Utah State Department of Insurance ("Department of Insurance" 
or "Defendant") to a position within the Market Conduct Division 
of the Department of Insurance during April of 1990, and that she 
was subsequently given an unfavorable written evaluation and 
denied an opportunity for a promotion within the Solvency 
Division. Alumbaugh alleges that such acts were in violation of 
several Rules of the Utah Department of Human Resource Management 
and several provisions of an Employee Handbook which was issued 
by the Department of Human Resource Management, and which 
governed Alumbaugh's employment with the Department of Insurance. 
Alumbaugh alleges that Defendant's violation of such Rules and 
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Handbook provisions constituted a denial of Alumbaugh's right 
of due process under the Constitutions of the United States and 
the State of Utah, and breach of an implied contract of 
employment. 
Alumbaugh filed her Complaint in the District Court, 
alleging claims for violation of Federal Due Process and Breach 
of Contract on December 26, 1991. Alumbaugh subsequently filed 
an Amended Complaint, which added a claim for violation of State 
Due Process. Defendant filed Motions to Dismiss each of 
Alumbaugh's claims on various grounds. Following the submission 
of supporting and opposing memoranda by both parties and oral 
argument, the District Court issued its Order of Dismissal, dated 
July 10, 1992. Said Order of Dismissal, a true and correct copy 
of which appears in the Addendum hereto at pages 14-15, dismisses 
each of Alumbaugh's claims without prejudice for failure to 
exhaust administrative and statutory remedies. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1* During approximately November of 1981 Alumbaugh 
commenced her employment as a Grade 13 Office Technician within 
the Department of Insurance. (Amended Complaint, Para. 1; 
R. 65.) 
2. Subsequent to the commencement of her employment, 
Alumbaugh received several promotions and upgrades, culminating 
in her promotion to the position of Grade 15 Insurance Technician 
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within the Solvency Division of the Utah State Department of 
Insurance on or about November 12, 1983* (Amended Complaint, 
Para. 2; R. 65.) 
3. During approximately November of 1989, Vanna Hunter 
("Hunter") became employed as Alumbaugh's immediate supervisor 
within the Solvency Division. Also during approximately November 
of 1989, Leonard Stillman ("Stillman") became the Director of the 
Solvency Division and was Hunter's direct supervisor. (Amended 
Complaint, Para. 3; R. 65.) 
4. Subsequent to the commencement of Hunter's and 
Stillman's employment in the Solvency Division, Alumbaugh was 
assigned to perform additional responsibilities and was required 
to undergo training related to such additional responsibilities. 
(Amended Complaint, Para. 4; R. 65.) 
5. On or about February 20, 199 0 Alumbaugh met with 
Stillman and informed Stillman that, in Alumbaugh's opinion, 
Hunter had not sufficiently communicated Alumbaugh's new job 
responsibilities to Alumbaugh, that Hunter had been excessively 
critical of Alumbaugh's work performance, and that Hunter had not 
adequately trained Alumbaugh in relation to Alumbaugh's new job 
responsibilities. In reply to Alumbaugh's comments, Stillman 
asked Alumbaugh if she would like a transfer to a new position. 
Alumbaugh inquired as to the specific nature of the transfer, and 
Stillman said that he would talk to Personnel Director, Olga 
Tsakakis ("Tsakakis"), and would get back to Alumbaugh within 
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t h i r t y (3 0) d a y s . Alumbaugh then s t a t e d tha t if she were to 
t r ans f e r , she would want to remain within the Solvency Divis ion. 
(Amended Complaint, Para. 5; R. 66.) 
6. Several days a f t e r Alumbaugh's meeting with Sti l lman, 
as r e f e r r e d t o in the immediately preceding paragraph hereof, 
Alumbaugh contacted Tsakakis r e g a r d i n g the p o t e n t i a l t r a n s f e r 
t h a t S t i l l m a n had p r o p o s e d . In r e s p o n s e t o Alumbaugh ' s 
statement, Tsakakis said tha t she was unaware of any t r a n s f e r 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s e x i s t i n g a t t h a t t ime. Tsakakis fur ther s ta ted 
tha t any proposed t r ans fe r would require input from the employee 
who was to be t r ans fe r red . (Amended Complaint, Para. 6; R. 66.) 
7 . On or about March 20, 199 0 Alumbaugh was ca l led in to a 
meet ing wi th Commissioner Harold C. Yancey ("Yancey"), during 
which Yancey s t a t e d t h a t Hunter had informed him of c e r t a i n 
a l l e g e d d e f i c i e n c i e s in Alumbaugh's work performance and tha t 
Yancey wanted Alumbaugh t o t r a n s f e r t o a Grade 15 Insu rance 
Technic ian p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the Market Conduct Division, which 
p o s i t i o n was t h e n h e l d by employee S a n d r a C h r i s t e n s e n 
( "Chr i s tensen") , and t h a t Chris tensen would be t ransfer red to 
Alumbaugh's pos i t ion in the Solvency Department. In response to 
Yancey's s t a t emen t , Alumbaugh asked what would happen if she 
refused the t r ans fe r , upon which Yancey s t a ted tha t if Alumbaugh 
chose to remain in her current pos i t ion , and did not meet the job 
spec i f ica t ions for t h a t p o s i t i o n w i t h i n s i x (6) to e i g h t (8) 
months, Alumbaugh1s employment would be terminated. Yancey then 
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gave Alumbaugh a copy of the job description for the position in 
the Market Conduct Division, to which he proposed to transfer 
Alumbaugh. Upon review of said job description, Alumbaugh stated 
to Yancey that the transfer was a demotion, in response to which 
Yancey stated that the position was not a demotion because 
Alumbaugh would not lose any wages or benefits. Alumbaugh then 
stated that she would accept the transfer under protest because 
it was apparent that Yancey intended to terminate Alumbaugh's 
employment if she did not accept the transfer. Alumbaugh further 
stated that she would file a grievance in relation to the 
transfer. (Amended Complaint, Para. 7; R. 66-67.) 
8. On or about April 3, 1990 Alumbaugh commenced her 
employment as a Grade 15 Insurance Technician within the Market 
Conduct Division. Upon information and belief, Christensen 
commenced work in Alumbaugh1s former position within the Solvency 
Division on the same date. (Amended Complaint, Para. 8; 
R. 67-68.) 
9. On or about April 6, 1990 Alumbaugh filed a grievance, 
pursuant to the Utah Grievance and Appeals Procedure Act, UCA 
Section 67-19a-101 et seq., in which Alumbaugh alleged that her 
transfer to the Market Conduct Division was involuntary, was 
implemented without sufficient notice of any deficiency in 
Alumbaugh's work performance and without affording Alumbaugh an 
opportunity to improve any deficiency in her work performance, in 
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violation of various rules and policies of the Department of 
Insurance and the Department of Human Resource Management. 
(Amended Complaint, Para. 9; R. 68.) 
10. On or about April 9, 1991 Alumbaugh was given a written 
Performance Evaluation which had been prepared by Hunter, and 
which purported to review Alumbaugh1s work performance during the 
period of October 1, 1989 to April 1, 1990. While such 
evaluation rated Alumbaugh's overall work performance as 
"successful," the evaluation contained several statements which 
were highly critical of Alumbaugh's work performance. Subsequent 
to the issuance of said evaluation, Alumbaugh alleged within her 
grievance that such evaluation had been issued in retaliation for 
the filing of her grievance. (Amended Complaint, Para. 10; 
R. 68.) 
11. On or about September 5, 1990 Christensen was promoted 
to the position of Grade 19 Insurance Forms Technician within the 
Department of Insurance. Upon information and belief, such 
promotion was implemented in a manner which was not consistent 
with established policies of the Department of Insurance and the 
Utah Department of Human Resource Management, in that such 
promotion was not authorized by the Department of Human Resource 
Management, and in that Christensen was pre-selected for the 
position to the exclusion of other qualified potential 
applicants, including Alumbaugh. (Amended Complaint, Para. 11; 
R. 68-69.) 
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12. On or about October 26, 1990, Alumbaugh's former 
position of Grade 15 Insurance Technician within the Solvency 
Division, which Christensen had held prior to her promotion 
to Insurance Forms Technician, was "reclassified" to a Grade 15 
Secretary position. (Amended Complaint, Para. 12; R. 69.) 
13. Upon information and belief, the Grade 19 Insurance 
Forms Technician and the Grade 15 Secretary position, which 
were created subsequent to Alumbaugh's transfer from the Solvency 
Division, each performed some of the duties which Alumbaugh 
previously performed as a Grade 15 Insurance Technician within 
the Solvency Division. (Amended Complaint, Para. 13; R. 69.) 
14. The position to which Alumbaugh was transferred within 
the Market Conduct Division, on or about April 3, 1990, requires 
less technical expertise, and provides fewer opportunities for 
advancement and promotion than Alumbaugh's former position in 
the Solvency Division. (Amended Complaint, Para. 14; R. 69.) 
15. Following the filing of Alumbaugh's grievance, said 
grievance proceeded through the first four levels of appeal 
as specified by the Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, UCA 
47-19a-402, which consisted of review by Alumbaugh's line 
management, who held that Plaintiff's transfer had been 
voluntary. (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
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Motion to Dismiss [hereinafter cited as "Plaintiff's Memo"], page 
3; R. 27.J1 
16, On May 11, 1990 Alumbaugh filed a request with the 
Utah Career Service Review Board to advance her grievance to 
Level 5 pursuant to UCA Section 67-19a-402 (5) . (Plaintiff's 
Memo., pages 3-4; R. 27-28.) 
17. On May 21, 1990 the Career Service Review Board, 
per Administrator Robert,N. White, issued a Jurisdictional 
Decision and Summary Ruling ("Jurisdictional Decision"), which 
held in essence that the Career Service Review Board had no 
jurisdiction over Alumbaugh1s claims pursuant to UCA Section 
67-19a-3Q2(1). Said Jurisdictional Decision states in part: 
^Alumbaugh's grievance proceeding culminated in a summary 
ruling by the Utah Career Service Review Board that the Board 
lacked jurisdiction over Alumbaugh1s claims. Alumbaugh 
subsequently appealed the decision of the Career Service Review 
Board to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held 
that the Jurisdictional Decision of the Career Service Review 
Board constituted an informal adjudicative determination pursuant 
to UCA Section 63-46b-15, for which review must be sought in the 
District Court, rather than in the Court of Appeals. See 
Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990). Alumbaugh 
subsequently filed a Petition for Review of the Career Service 
Review Board's decision in the Third District Court. See 
Alumbaugh v. White, Case No. 910902395AA. Said Petition for 
Review was dismissed without prejudice on November 18, 1992. 
Alumbaugh1s grievance proceeding and related appeals to the 
Utah Court of Appeals and the District Court are hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Alumbaugh I." Alumbaugh respectfull 
requests that this Court take judicial notice of the records and 
files in Alumbaugh I pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
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[I]t is concluded that Grievant's requested remedies 
are inappropriate to the Grievance Procedures based on 
the following: 
(a) Requests for desk audits and all 
classification appeals are not within the scope of the 
Insurance Department, but require application to DHRM 
(Section 67-19-31 and R468-4-5), nor do these matters 
come under the jurisdiction of the CSRB. 
(b) The CSRB lacks remedy powers over monetary 
awards for embarrassment and emotional distress. Such 
complaints may be petitioned through the general 
courts. The CSRB may not even award attorney's fees. 
(Section 67-19a-408 (4).) 
(c) Any future salary increases are a prospective 
(future-oriented) matter, and the award or lack of 
award of future increases can only be treated at the 
time of occurrence. Grievant's requested remedy anent 
future salary increases is now premature. A grievance 
may always be filed coincident with any future award or 
the denial of an award on salary increase matters, but 
there is no present injury or harm cited in the instant 
grievance which may be treated at this time. 
(Plaintiff's Memo., Exhibit "A," R. 47-54.)2 
18. On June 19, 1990 Alumbaugh filed a Petition for 
Review in the Utah Court of Appeals, in which Alumbaugh sought 
reversal of Administrator White's Jurisdictional Decision. On 
October 20, 19 9 0 the Court of Appeals issued an opinion which 
held, in essence, that the Jurisdictional Decision and Summary 
Decision of the Career Service Review Board constituted an 
informal adjudicative proceeding, for which review must be sought 
in the District Court, rather than in the Court of Appeals, 
^A true and correct copy of said Jurisdictional Decision is 
contained within the Addendum hereto at pages 16-23. 
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pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46d-5. Therefore, 
Alumbaugh's Petition for Review was transferred by the Court of 
Appeals to the Third District Court. See Alumbaugh v. White, 800 
P.2d 825 (Utah, App. 1990). (Plaintiff's Memo., page 5; R. 29.) 
19. On April 12, 1991 Alumbaugh filed a Petition for 
Review of the May 21, 199 0 Jurisdictional Decision and Summary 
Ruling in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, Case No. 910902395AA. (Plaintiff's Memo., page 5; R. 29.) 
Alumbaugh's grievance proceeding under the Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act and related appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals 
and the District Court are collectively referred to herein as 
"Alumbaugh 1." 
20. On September 24, 1991 Alumbaugh filed in Alumbaugh 
I_ a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint which, in 
essence, sought to add some of the claims which Alumbaugh has 
alleged in the present action (i.e., for violation of Federal Due 
Process and breach of contract) to her Petition for Review of the 
Jurisdictional Decision. The Defendant opposed said Motion, 
asserting that Alumbaugh could not join such claims with her 
Petition for Review. On November 8, 1991 the Court in 
Alumbaugh I issued its Minute Entry, which denied Alumbaugh's 
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. 
(Plaintiff's Memo., pages 5-6; R. 29-30.) 
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- 4 1 . Alumbaugh commenced the p r e s e n t a c t i o n on December 
26, 1991. Alumbaugh's o r ig ina l Complaint a l leged two Causes of 
Action: for v io l a t i on of Federal Due Process pursuant to 42 USC 
Section 1983 and for breach of con t rac t . 
2 2 . On February 24, 1992 Defendant f i l e d a Motion to 
Dismiss both Causes of Action within Alumbaugh1s Complaint on the 
following grounds: 
(a) That a s t a t e cannot be held l i a b l e under 42 USC 
Section 1983. 
(b) That t h e t e rms of Alumbaugh1 s employment a re 
governed by s t a t u t e and r u l e ; t h e r e f o r e , no c o n t r a c t u a l 
obl igat ion could ex i s t between Alumbaugh and Defendant. 
(c) That Alumbaugh has not exhausted her adminis t ra t ive 
remedies inasmuch as the Ju r i sd i c t i ona l Decision of the Career 
Service Review Board i s c u r r e n t l y on review in the D i s t r i c t 
Court. (R. 13-23.) 
23 . On March l l f 1992 Alumbaugh f i l e d a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant ' s Motion t o Dismiss , da ted March 11 , 
199 2, wherein Alumbaugh contested each of the asser ted grounds 
f o r d i s m i s s a l w i t h i n D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s . 
Speci f ica l ly , Alumbaugh argued: 
(a) That e x h a u s t i o n of r e m e d i e s under t h e Utah 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act i s not a p r e r e q u i s i t e for 
the asse r t ion of her cons t i tu t iona l and contract claims. 
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(b) That Alumbaugh should be excused from any 
exhaustion requirement because the Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act provides no remedy to Alumbaugh and exhaustion of 
such procedures would be futile. 
(c) That Alumbaugh has exhausted any remedy which 
she may be required to exhaust under the Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act. 
(d) That Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for 
injunctive relief under 42 USC Section 1983. 
(e) That Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for 
breach of contract. (R. 25-56.) 
24. On March 17, 1992 Alumbaugh filed an Amended Complaint 
which was identical to her original Complaint, except that it 
added a Third Cause of Action for violation of Due Process under 
the Utah State Constitution. (R. 64-74.) 
25. On March 24, 1992 Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the Third Cause of Action within Alumbaugh1s Amended Complaint on 
the grounds that a claim based upon the Utah Constitution should 
not be recognized where the Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
Act provides a remedy for the injuries claimed by Alumbaugh. 
(R. 75-86.) 
26. Following the submission of responsive memoranda 
by both parties, Defendant's Motions to Dismiss came for hearing 
before the District Court, the Honorable Richard J. Moffat 
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presiding, on June 12, 1992. After oral argument, Judge Moffat 
ruled that Alumbaugh had not exhausted her administrative and 
statutory remedies, and that Alumbaugh1s Amended Complaint was, 
therefore, dismissed without prejudice. (R. 122.) 
27. On July 10, 1992 the District Court, per Judge Moffat, 
issued its Order of Dismissal, which constitutes the final order 
from which this Appeal is taken. Said Order of Dismissal states 
in relevant part: "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Complaint is granted for the reason that Plaintiff has failed to 
exhaust the administrative and statutory remedies for the review 
of grievance procedures." {R. 123-124.) (See Addendum, pages 
14-15.) 
28. On November 18, 1992 the District Court, per the 
Honorable David S. Young, dismissed the Petition for Review in 
Alumbaugh I without prejudice, for the reason that Alumbaugh 
wishes to hold such Petition in abeyance pending the 
determination of her rights in this Appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Alumbaugh was not required to exhaust any remedy which she 
may have under the Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act prior 
to bringing suit upon her constitutional and contract claims. 
The Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act contains no provision 
limiting the availability of constitutional or common law 
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remedies* To the contrary, the language of the act is 
consistently permissive in nature, e.g., "the employee may submit 
the grievance in writing to the administrator. . . . " UCA 
Section 67-19a-402(5) (emphasis added). Further, the Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures Act has no application to Alumbaugh's claim 
for violation of Federal Due Process under 42 USC Section 1983. 
POINT II 
Even if exhaustion of remedies under the Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures Act is required in some circumstances, it 
should not be required in the present case. As it appears from 
the express provisions of the Act, and as reflected within 
the Career Service Review Board's Jurisdictional Decision, the 
Board lacks authority to order any substantive relief for the 
injuries alleged by Alumbaugh in this case. Therefore, 
exhaustion of such remedies would be futile. 
POINT III 
Even if Alumbaugh was required to exhaust her remedies under 
the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, she has already done so, 
by processing her grievance to the Career Service Review Board, 
which has held that it lacks jurisdiction over Alumbaugh's 
claims. Alumbaugh's only remaining recourse is to the District 
Court, where she should be allowed to bring any claims which she 
may have arising from her alleged injuries. 
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POINT IV 
Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for violation of 
Federal Due Process. Defendant has argued that a cause of action 
under 42 USC Section 1983 is unavailable against the State of 
Utah, and Alumbaugh has contested this point. Although the 
District Court did not expressly decide this issue, this issue 
was raised within the District Court and is potentially 
dispositive of Alumbaugh's Federal Due Process claim. 
POINT V 
Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for violation of 
State Due Process. Defendant argued in the District Court that a 
cause of action under the Due Process clause of the Utah 
Constitution should not be recognized where a statutory remedy 
exists for the alleged injuries. However, Alumbaugh submits that 
she has no substantive remedy under the Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act and must therefore be allowed a cause of action 
under the Utah Constitution. Although the District Court did not 
expressly decide this issue, this issue was raised within the 
District Court and is potentially dispositive of Alumbaugh's 
State Due Process claim. 
POINT VI 
Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for breach of 
contract. Defendant argued in the District Court that a breach 
of contract claim is unavailable where the terms and conditions 
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of employment are governed by statute or rule, and Alumbaugh has 
contested this point. Although the District Court did not 
expressly decide this issue, this issue was raised in the 
District Court and is potentially dispositive of Alumbaugh's 
breach of contract claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I . THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ALUMBAUGH'S 
CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST REMEDIES 
A. Alumbaugh Was Not R e q u i r e d t o E x h a u s t Her Remedies Under 
t h e U t a h G r i e v a n c e and Appeal P r o c e d u r e s Act P r i o r t o A s s e r t i n g 
Her C o n s t i t u t i o n a l and C o n t r a c t C l a i m s . 
D e f e n d a n t a r g u e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t A l u m b a u g h 
s h o u l d b e r e q u i r e d t o e x h a u s t h e r r e m e d i e s u n d e r t h e G r i e v a n c e 
and Appeal P r o c e d u r e s A c t , UCA S e c t i o n 6 7 - 1 9 a - 1 0 1 , e t s e q . , p r i o r 
t o b r i n g i n g h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d c o n t r a c t c l a i m s . S e e 
M e m o r a n d u m i n S u p p o r t o f D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s 
( " D e f e n d a n t ' s Memo," p a g e s 7 - 9 ) , and Rep ly Memorandum i n S u p p o r t 
of D e f e n d a n t ' s Mot ion t o D i s m i s s ( " D e f e n d a n t ' s R e p l y M e m o . " ) , 
p a g e s 3 - 6 , 2 1 - 2 3 (R . 5 9 - 6 2 ) . H o w e v e r , D e f e n d a n t c i t e d no 
r e a s o n o r a u t h o r i t y i n s u p p o r t of s u c h p o s i t i o n . 
I n Ha t ton -Ward v . S a l t Lake C i t y C o r p o r a t i o n , 828 P .2d 1 0 7 1 , 
182 Utah Adv. Rep . 44 (Utah App. 1 9 9 2 ) , t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t a 
p l a i n t i f f was n o t r e q u i r e d t o e x h a u s t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s 
i n t h e C i v i l S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n p r i o r t o b r i n g i n g a j u d i c i a l 
a c t i o n u n d e r t h e S t a t e w h i s t l e - b l o w e r s t a t u t e . I n so h o l d i n g , 
t h e Cour t s t a t e d a t p a g e 1 0 7 3 : 
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Noth ing in the language of the c i v i l s e r v i c e 
s t a t u t e empowers the Commission to hear ce r t a in claims 
specif ied in the whis t le blower s t a t u t e such as th rea t s 
and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n made in r e t a l i a t i o n for w h i s t l e 
b l o w i n g . N e i t h e r does the language of the c i v i l 
s e r v i c e s t a t u t e s u g g e s t t h a t t h e Commission i s 
empowered t o p r o v i d e any remedy o t h e r than those 
r e l a t e d t o r e i n s t a t e m e n t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e 
Commission i s barred from granting a t torney fees, which 
may be awarded in the whis t le blower s t a t u t e , as well 
as c i v i l damages, and c i v i l f i ne s . 
We note t h a t h e r e , Hatton-Ward i s not seeking 
r e i n s t a t e m e n t , but r a the r c i v i l damages and a t torney 
fees . Thus, i t makes no sense to require him f i r s t to 
go to the Commission to pursue a remedy he does not 
want . The law does not r e q u i r e the exhaus t ion of 
admin is t ra t ive remedies when i t would serve no useful 
purpose. Moreover, once an employee br ings an ac t i on 
before the Commission, he or she i s then e n t i t l e d only 
to a review of whether the Commission exceeded i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n and j u r i s d i c t i o n . We thus see nothing in 
the p l a i n and unambiguous l anguage of e i t h e r t h e 
w h i s t l e blower s t a t u t e or the c i v i l service s t a t u t e 
suggesting a claimant must f i r s t br ing a whis t le blower 
c la im to the Commission before proceeding in s t a t e 
cour t . (Citat ions de le ted . ) 
The reason ing which was applied in Hatton-Ward i s equally 
compelling in the present case . Like the Civil Service s t a t u t e 
which was a t i s s u e in Hatton-Ward, the remedies which a re 
authorized under the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act a re 
very l i m i t e d . The only p r o v i s i o n s of the Act which may be 
construed as authorizing any remedy are UCA Section 67-19a-408, 
which i m p l i e s t h a t the Board may order the placement of a 
grievant on the reappointment ro s t e r and back wages and benef i t s , 
and 67-19a-303 (4) (c) , which implies tha t the Board may rescind 
any d i sc ip l ina ry act ion against an employee. The Act contains no 
remedy r e l a t i n g t o a l l e g e d l y n o n - d i s c i p l i n a r y t r a n s f e r s , 
r e t a l i a t o r y evaluations or pre-se lec ted promotions. 
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The Career Service Review Board's Jurisdictional Decision in 
this case emphasized its inability to order any type of 
substantive relief for the injuries alleged by Alumbaugh. 
Specifically, the Administrator held that he lacks authority to 
award monetary damages or prospective relief* (R. 47-54.) (See 
Addendum at pages 22-23•) 
Given these limitations upon the remedies under the 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, it is clear that the Act was 
not intended to provide relief for the type of constitutional and 
rule violations which Alumbaugh alleges in this case.3 There is 
nothing within the Act which can reasonably be construed as 
supplanting or limiting other remedies which may be available 
outside of the Act. 
Even if exhaustion of remedies under the Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures Act is required in some circumstances, it 
should not be applied to Alumbaugh1 s Federal Due Process claim 
under 42 USC Section 1983. It is generally held that exhaustion 
of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to claims 
under Section 1983. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n., 110 
S.C.T. 2510, 2524 (1990); Stana v. School Dist. of City of 
Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 129-130 (3rd Cir. 1985)? Holmes 
v. Wampler, 546 F.Supp. 500-503 (E.D. Va. 1982). Defendant did 
^Defendant has not argued that it did not violate the Rules 
and Employee Handbook provisions as Alumbaugh alleges, nor has 
Defendant argued that Alumbaugh does not have a constitutionally 
protected property and liberty interest in her employment. 
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not address this point in the District Court, and the District 
Court's dismissal of Alumbaugh's Section 1983 claim was clearly 
erroneous. 
B. Alumbaugh Should be Excused from Exhausting Her Remedies 
Under the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act Due to the Futility 
of Such Remedies. 
As the Court noted in Hat t on -Ward, 828 P. 2d at 1073, "The 
law does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies 
when it would serve no useful purpose." In the present case, any 
procedures to which Alumbaugh may be entitled under the Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures Act are rendered futile by the 
unavailability of any substantive remedy under the Act* 
Defendant argued in the District Court that, contrary to the 
ruling of the Career Service Review Board, Alumbaugh's claims 
fall within the Board's jurisdiction, (R. 59-62.) Alumbaugh 
agrees that the Board's ruling as to jurisdiction is erroneous, 
and that the Board probably does have jurisdiction over 
Alumbaugh's claims pursuant to UCA Section 67-19a-302 (1) . 
However, the important point is that, even if the Board has 
jurisdiction, it lacks statutory authority to order any relief 
for all or most of the injuries which Alumbaugh alleges. 
Alumbaugh should not be required to exhaust a procedure which, 
though available, provides no adequate remedy. 
- 21 -
c#
 Alumbaugh Has Sufficiently Exhausted Her Administrative 
Remedy. 
Alumbaugh argued in the District Court that she sufficiently 
exhausted her administrative remedies before filing the present 
action (R. 97). Alumbaugh processed her grievance through the 
first four levels as required by UCA Section 67-19a-402. 
Alumbaugh then sought review by the Career Service Review Board 
pursuant to 67-19a-403. The Board ruled that it lacks 
jurisdiction. After such ruling, Alumbaugh1s sole recourse is to 
the District Court, where Alumbaugh should be allowed to bring 
any claim which she has arising from the alleged injuries. 
Alumbaugh fully exhausted her administrative procedures under the 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act. 
All of the cases which Defendant has cited on the exhaustion 
issue involve situations wherein the petitioner sought Court 
review of an agency decision before the agency had fully 
completed its processing of the claim. (See Defendant's Memo, 
pages 7-8, R. 21-22 and cases cited therein.) Such is not the 
situation in the present case, where the Career Service Review 
Board has reached a final determination upon Alumbaugh's claims. 
Defendant has not addressed the issue of whether Alumbaugh has in 
fact exhausted her administrative remedies. 
II. ALUMBAUGH HAS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM UNDER 42 USC 
SECTION 1983 
Defendant argued in the District Court that a cause of 
action under 42 USC Section 1983 will not lie against the State 
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of Utah (R.17). In support of this position, Defendant cites the 
U.S. Supreme Court case of Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). 
However, as Alumbaugh observed in the District Court, Will only 
prohibits an award of damages against state governments under 
Section 1983. Will does not alter the long-established rule that 
injunctive relief may be ordered against a state under Section 
1983. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. at 71, note 10. 
In response to this point, Defendant argued in the District 
Court that the injunctive relief which Alumbaugh seeks in this 
case is not "prospective, " and therefore may not be obtained 
under Section 1983. Defendant states on page 2 of its Reply Memo 
(R. 58): 
In the instant case, plaintiff's complaint does 
not seek prospective relief. Rather, plaintiff 
requests this Court to adjudicate whether the State 
violated her due process rights when she was 
transferred to another position of employment within 
the State agency. 
Defendant has identified no meaningful distinction between 
the type of injunctive relief which Alumbaugh seeks in this case 
and the type of injunctive relief which is typically awarded 
under Section 1983. Defendant erroneously states that injunctive 
relief under Section 1983 is limited to "declaratory" injunctive 
relief, and not "compensatory" injunctive relief. (Defendant's 
Reply Memo, page 2, note 1, R. 58.) However, the cases decided 
under Section 1983 reflect no such distinction, nor has Defendant 
cited any authority in support of this assertion. Alumbaugh has 
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sufficiently stated a claim for injunctive relief under Section 
1983. 
III. ALUMBAUGH HAS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM FOR VIOLATION 
OF DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a claim under the Due 
Process clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, 
may arise in the public employment context. Worrall v. Ogden 
City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980). 
Defendant conceded in the District Court that such a claim 
may be available in some circumstances, but argued that such a 
claim should not be recognized where the Plaintiff has available 
a statutory remedy which adequately vindicates the asserted 
constitutional right. (R. 81-82.) 
Alumbaugh does not disagree with the general proposition 
stated by Defendant. However, Alumbaugh submits that she has no 
adequate statutory remedy in this case and that, as a result, she 
has sufficiently stated a claim under the Utah Constitution. 
IV. ALUMBAUGH HAS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF 
IMPLIED CONTRACT 
Alumbaugh argued in the District Court that the Rules and 
Employee Handbook, which were promulgated by the Utah Department 
of Human Resource Management, and which governed Alumbaugh1 s 
employment with the Department of Insurance, established an 
implied contract of employment pursuant to Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). (R. 39-40.) 
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Defendant's only argument on this issue is that no implied 
contract of employment can exist where the employment 
relationship is governed by statute and rule (R. 17-21) • 
However, all of the cases which Defendant has cited on this point 
involve situations in which the Plaintiff sought to enforce a 
contract which was in conflict with a controlling statute, e.g., 
Lamborn v. Jessop, 631 P.2d 917 (Utah 1981). In the present 
case, Alumbaugh seeks to enforce an implied contract which is 
entirely consistent with and in fact arises from the Rules and 
Handbook which have been promulgated by the Department of Human 
Resource Management pursuant to its statutory authority. 
Defendant has made no argument that the contractual rights 
asserted by Alumbaugh are in any way inconsistent with her 
statutory rights. 
In Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 
(Utah 1981), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's Personnel 
Policies and Procedures had created an implied contract of 
employment, which had been violated by defendant in terminating 
the plaintiff's employment. In upholding the District Court's 
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
This finding comports with the numerous holdings that 
an educational i n s t i t u t i o n may undertake a contractual 
o b l i g a t i o n t o o b s e r v e p a r t i c u l a r t e r m i n a t i o n 
formal i t ies by adopting procedures or by promulgating 
r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g t h e employment 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . (Citat ions de le ted . ) 
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The Piacitelli Court proceeded to distinguish between the 
plaintiff's claims under 42 USC Section 1983 and for breach of 
contract, and awarded the plaintiff lost wages exclusively under 
the contract theory. Id. at 1068-1070. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish Piacitelli on page 5 of 
its Reply Memo (R. 61) , by stating that teaching positions are 
exempted from the State career service provisions pursuant to UCA 
Section 67-19-15(h). While this is true, it is equally true that 
teaching positions are subject to extensive statutory control. 
For example, UCA Section 53A-8-101 et. seq. establishes a detailed 
administrative procedures for employment-related grievances 
pertaining to teaching positions, yet the existence of such 
remedies did not defeat the Plaintiff's contract claim in 
Piacitelli. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and argument, 
Alumbaugh respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reverse 
the District Court's Order of Dismissal in its entirety and 
remand this case to the District Court for consideration of the 
merits of Alumbaugh's claims. 
DATED this / 5 day of January, 1993. 
PERKINS,^ , SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
DAVID W. 3THWOBE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Section 7 1 
Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, 
UCA Section 67-19a-101-67-19a-408 2-13 
Order of Dismissal, dated July 10, 1992 14-17 
Jurisdictional Decision and Summary Ruling, 
dated May 21, 1990 18-23 
Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Abjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus 9 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
CJ.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2. 
A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.LJL3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 82; 
Weapons *= 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec, 7. [Due process of law,] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 67-19-40 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-38, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 280, § 7. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 280 be-
came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
67-19-39. Exemptions. 
Peace officers, as defined under Section 77-la-l, acting in their official 
capacity as peace officers in undercover roles and assignments, are exempt 
from the provisions of this act. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-39, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 280, § 8. 
Meaning of "this act" — The phrase "this 
act" means Laws 1990, ch. 280 which enacted 
§§ 67-19-33 through 67-19-39. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 280 be-
came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
67-19-40. State benefits for servicemembers activated due 
to Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert 
Storm. 
(1) All agencies may continue to pay, for employees activated due to Opera-
tion Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, their portion of: 
(a) the premium for health and dental insurance; and 
(b) the premium for the basic life insurance provided by the state. 
(2) All agencies may also grant the 15-day military leave for employees 
activated due to Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-40, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 253, § 2. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 253 be-
came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Administrator" means the person employed by the board to assist 
in administering personnel policies. 
(2) "Board" means the Career Service Review Board created by this 
chapter. 
(3) "Career service employee" means a person employed in career ser-
vice as defined in Section 67-19-3. 
(4) "Employer" means the state of Utah and all supervisory personnel 
vested with the authority to implement and administer the policies of the 
department. 
(5) "Grievance" means: 
(a) a complaint by a career service employee concerning any mat-
ter touching upon the relationship between the employee and his 
employer; and 
(b) any dispute between a career service employee and his em-
ployer. 
(6) "Supervisor" means the person to whom an employee reports and 
who assigns and oversees the employee's work. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-101, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 6; 1991, ch. 101, § 2; 1991, 
ch. 204, § 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment by ch. 101, effective April 29,1991, added 
present Subsection (3); designated former Sub-
sections (3) to (5) as present Subsections (4) to 
(6); and substituted "the policies of the depart-
ment" for "the state's personnel policies" at the 
end of present Subsection (4). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective 
April 29, 1991, substituted "a career service" 
for "an" in present Subsections (5)(a) and 
(5)(b). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
OfBce of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
came effective on Apnl 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 67-19a-201 
PART 2 
•CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
67-19a-201. Career Service Review Board created — Mem-
bers — Appointment — Removal — Terms — Or-
ganization — Compensation. 
(1) There is created a Career Service Review Board. 
(2) (a) The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall ap-
point five members to the board no more than three of which are members 
of the same political party. 
(b) The governor shall appoint members whose gender and ethnicity 
represent the career service work force. 
(c) The governor may remove any board member for cause and appoint 
a replacement to complete the unexpired term of the member removed for 
cause. 
(3) The governor shall ensure that appointees to the board: 
(a) are qualified by knowledge of employee relations and merit system 
principles in public employment; and 
(b) are not: 
(i) members of any local, state, or national committee of a political 
party; 
(ii) officers or members of a committee in any partisan political 
club; and 
(iii) holding or a candidate for a paid public office. 
(4) (a) The governor shall appoint board members to serve four-year terms 
as follows: 
(i) three members shall be appointed to a term beginning and end-
ing with the governor's term; and 
(ii) two members shall be appointed to four-year terms beginning 
January 1 of the third year of the governor's regular term in office. 
(b) The members of the board shall serve until their successors are 
appointed and qualified. 
(c) Persons serving on the board as of the effective date of this act may 
complete the term for which they were appointed. 
(d) If a vacancy occurs on the board, the governor may appoint a new 
person to fill the unexpired term. 
(5) Each year, the board shall choose a chairman and vice-chairman from 
its own members. 
(6) (a) Three members of the board are a quorum for the transaction of 
business. 
(b) Action by a majority of members when a quorum is present is action 
of the board. 
(7) Members of the board shall serve without compensation, but they may 
be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties 
as established by the Division of Finance. 
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67-19a-202 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-201, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 7. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
67-19a-202. Powers — Jurisdiction. 
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final administrative body to review 
appeals from career service employees and agencies of decisions about 
promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, 
wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equita-
ble administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concern-
ing abandonment of position that have not been resolved at an earlier 
stage in the grievance procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other person-
nel matters. 
(2) The time limits established in this chapter supersede the procedural 
time limits established in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act. 
(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding, any member of the board may: 
(a) administer oaths; 
(b) certify official acts; 
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence; and 
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-202, enacted by "employees" in Subsection (l)(a), and "Admin-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 8; 1991, ch. 101, § 3; 1991, istrative Procedures Act" after "Title 63" in 
ch. 204, § 8. Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- This section is set out as reconciled by the 
mentbych. 101, effective April 29,1991, added office of Legislative Research and General 
Subsection (3)(d), making a related grammati- Counsel, 
cal change, and made a change in the style of Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
thLchaPne!* r e f e r e n c e i ? . S u b ? c S ? ? (2i: .. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective
 U t a h C ( ) n g t Art VI Sec 25 
April 29,1991, inserted "career service" before '' ' 
67-19a-203. Rulemaking authority. 
The board may make rules governing: 
(1) definitions of terms, phrases, and words used in the grievance pro-
cess established by this chapter; 
(2) what matters constitute excusable neglect for purposes of the 
waiver of time limits established by this chapter; 
(3) the application for and service of subpoenas, the service and filing 
of pleadings, and the issuance of rulings, orders, determinations, sum-
mary judgments, transcripts, and other legal documents necessary in 
grievance proceedings; 
(4) the use, calling, attendance, participation, and fees of witnesses in 
grievance proceedings; 
(5) continuances of grievance proceedings; 
(6) procedures in jurisdictional and evidentiary hearings, unless gov-
erned by Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act; 
(7) the presence of media representatives at grievance proceedings; and 
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(8) procedures for sealing files or making data pertaining to a griev-
ance unavailable to the public. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-203, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 9. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
67-19a-204. Administrator — Powers. 
(1) The board shall employ a person with demonstrated ability to adminis-
ter personnel policies to assist it in performing the functions specified in this 
chapter. 
(2) (a) The administrator may: 
(i) assign qualified, impartial hearing officers on a per case basis to 
adjudicate matters under the jurisdiction of the board; 
(ii) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence in conjunc-
tion with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other proceeding; 
and 
(iii) upon motion made by a party or person to whom the subpoena 
is directed and upon notice to the party who issued the subpoena, 
quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable, requires an exces-
sive number of witnesses, or requests evidence not relevant to any 
matter in issue, 
(b) In selecting and assigning hearing officers under authority of this 
section; the administrator shall appoint hearing officers that have demon-
strated by education, training, and experience the ability to adjudicate 
and resolve personnel administration disputes by applying employee rela-
tions principles within a large, public work force. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-204, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 191 be-
L. 1989, eh. 191, § 10; 1991, ch. 101, § 4. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(iii) and made related changes. 
PART 3 
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
67-19a-301. Charges submissible under grievance and ap-
peals procedure. 
(1) This grievance procedure may only be used by career service employees 
who are not: 
(a) public applicants for a position with the state's work force; 
(b) public employees of the state's political subdivisions; 
(c) public employees covered by other grievance procedures; or 
(d) employees of state institutions of higher education. 
(2) Whenever a question or dispute exists as to whether an employee is 
qualified to use this grievance procedure, the administrator shall resolve the 
question or dispute. The administrator's decision is reviewable only by the 
Court of Appeals. 
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(3) Any career service employee may submit a grievance based upon a 
claim or charge of injustice or oppression, including dismissal from employ-
ment, resulting from an act, occurrence, omission, or condition for solution 
through the grievance procedures set forth in this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-301, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 11; 1991, ch. 101, § 5. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsec-
tions (1) and (2) and designated the former sec-
tion as Subsection (3). 
67-19a-302. Levels of appealability of charges submissible 
under grievance and appeals procedure. 
(1) A career service employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demo-
tions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel 
rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions 
in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position to all levels of 
grievance procedure. 
(2) (a) A career service employee may grieve all other matters only to the 
level of his department head. 
(b) The decision of the department head is final and unappealable to 
the board. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-302, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 12; 1991, ch. 204, § 9. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "A 
career service" for "An aggrieved" in Subsec-
tion (1). 
67-19a-303. Employees' rights in grievance and appeals 
procedure. 
(1) For the purpose of processing a grievance, a career service employee 
may: 
(a) obtain assistance by a representative of the employee's choice to act 
as an advocate at any level of the grievance procedure; 
(b) request a reasonable amount of time during work hours to confer 
with the representative and prepare the grievance; and 
(c) call other employees as witnesses at a grievance hearing. 
(2) The state shall allow employees to attend and testify at the grievance 
hearing as witnesses if the employee has given reasonable advance notice to 
his immediate supervisor. 
(3) No person may take any reprisals against any career service employee 
for use of grievance procedures specified in this chapter. 
(4) (a) The employing agency of an employee who files a grievance may not 
place grievance forms, grievance materials, correspondence about the 
grievance, agency and department replies to the grievance, or other docu-
ments relating to the grievance in the employee's personnel file. 
(b) The employing agency of an employee who files a grievance may 
place records of disciplinary action in the employee's personnel file. 
(c) If any disciplinary action against an employee is rescinded through 
the grievance procedures established in this chapter, the agency and the 
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Department of Human Resource Management shall remove the record of 
the disciplinary action from the employee's agency personnel file and 
central personnel file. 
(d) An agency may maintain a separate grievance file relating to an 
employee's grievance, but shall discard the file after three years. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-303, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 13; 1991, ch. 204, § 10. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "a 
career service" for wanw in Subsection (1). 
PART 4 
PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY 
AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
67-19a-401. Time limits for submission of appeal by ag-
grieved employee — Voluntary termination of 
employment — Group grievances, 
(1) Subject to the standing requirements contained in Part 3 and the re-
strictions contained in this part, a career service employee may have a griev-
ance addressed by following the procedures specified in this part. 
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grievance is directed may 
agree in writing to waive or extend grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time limits 
specified for those grievance steps, as outlined in Section 67-19a-402. 
(3) Any writing made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be submitted to the 
administrator. 
(4) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the 
next step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived 
his right to process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the griev-
ance. 
(b) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the 
next step within the time limits established in this part, the grievance is 
considered to be settled based on the decision made at the last step. 
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, an employee may submit a grievance for review un-
der this chapter only if the employee submits the grievance: 
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the griev-
ance; or 
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge of 
the event giving rise to the grievance, 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (4)(a), an employee may not submit a 
grievance more than one year after the event giving rise to the grievance. 
(6) A person who has voluntarily terminated his employment with the state 
may not submit a grievance after he has terminated his employment. 
(7) (a) When several employees allege the same grievance, they may sub-
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(b) In submitting a group grievance, each aggrieved employee shall 
sign the complaint. 
(c) The administrator and board may not treat a group grievance as a 
class action, but may select one aggrieved employee's grievance and ad-
dress that grievance as a test case. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-401, enacted by former Subsections (3) to (6) as present Subsec-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 14; 1991, ch. 101, § 6; tions (4) to (7). 
1991, ch. 204, § 11. The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- April 29, 1991, substituted wa career service" 
ment by ch. 101, effective April 29, 1991, sub- for "an aggrieved" in Subsection (1). 
stituted "grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time This section is set out as reconciled by the 
limits specified for those grievance steps, as Office of Legislative Research and General 
outlined in Section 67-19a-402" for "any griev- Counsel. 
ance step or the time limits specified for any Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
grievance step" at the end of Subsection (2); came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
added present Subsection (3); and redesignated Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
67-19a-402. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved 
employee. 
(1) (a) A career service employee who believes he has a grievance shall 
attempt to resolve the grievance through discussion with his supervisor. 
(b) Within five days after the employee discusses the grievance with 
him, the employee's supervisor may issue a verbal decision on the griev-
ance. 
(2) (a) If the grievance remains unanswered for five working days after its 
submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the supervi-
sor's verbal decision, the employee may resubmit the grievance in writing 
to his immediate supervisor within five working days after the expiration 
of the period for response or receipt of the 'decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is 
submitted, the employee's supervisor shall issue a written response to the 
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision. 
(c) Immediately after submitting the written grievance to his supervi-
sor, the employee shall notify the administrator of the board that he has 
submitted the written grievance. 
(3) (a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's supervisor re-
mains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the 
aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee 
may submit the grievance in writing to his agency or division director 
within ten working days after the expiration of the period for decision or 
receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is 
submitted, the employee's agency or division director shall issue a written 
response to the grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the 
decision. 
(4) (a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's agency or divi-
sion director remains unanswered for five working days after its submis-
sion, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, 
the employee may submit the grievance in writing to his department 
head within ten working days after the expiration of the period for deci-
sion or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
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(b) Within ten working days after the employee's written grievance is 
submitted, the department head shall issue a written response to the 
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision. 
(c) The decision of the department head is final in all matters except 
those matters that the board may review under the authority of Part 3. 
(5) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's department head 
meets the subject matter requirements of Section 67-19a-302 and if the griev-
ance remains unanswered for ten working days after its submission, or if the 
aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee may 
submit the grievance in writing to the administrator within ten working days 
after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, which-
ever is first. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-402, enacted by The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 15; 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 3, 1991, substituted WA career service" for "An" in 
§ 2; 1991, ch. 204, § 12. Subsection (l)(a). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 (2nd S.S.) Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
amendment, effective October 10,1989, substi-
 c a m e effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
tuted "ten working days" for "five working
 U t a h Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
days" in Subsection (4)(b). 
67-19a-403. Appeal to administrator — Jurisdictional 
hearing. 
(1) At any time after a career service employee submits a grievance to the 
administrator under the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator 
may attempt to settle the grievance informally by conference, conciliation, 
and persuasion with the employee and the agency. 
(2) (a) When an employee submits a grievance to the administrator under 
the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator shall determine: 
(i) whether or not the employee is a career service employee and is 
entitled to use the grievance system; 
(ii) whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the grievance; 
(iii) whether or not the employee has been directly harmed; and 
(iv) the issues to be heard, 
(b) In order to make the determinations required by Subsection (2), the 
administrator may: 
(i) hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may present 
oral arguments, written arguments, or both; or 
(ii) conduct an administrative review of the file. 
(3) (a) If the administrator holds a jurisdictional hearing, he shall issue his 
written decision within 15 days after the hearing is adjourned. 
(b) If the administrator chooses to conduct an administrative review of 
the file, he shall issue his written decision within 15 days after he re-
ceives the grievance. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-403, enacted by Subsections (2)(a)(i) through (2)(a)(iii) as 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 16; 1991, ch. 204, § 13. present Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(iv) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added present came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Subsection (2)(a)(i) and redesignated former Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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67-19a-404. Administrator's responsibilities. 
If the administrator determines that the grievance meets the jurisdictional 
requirements of Part 3, he shall: 
(1) appoint a hearing officer to adjudicate the complaint; and 
(2) set a date for the hearing that is either: 
(a) not later than 30 days after the date the administrator issues 
his decision that the board has jurisdiction over the grievance; or 
(b) at a date agreed upon by the parties and the administrator. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-404, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 17. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
67-19a-405. Prehearing conference. 
(1) The administrator may require the presence of each party, the represen-
tatives of each party, and other designated persons at a prehearing confer-
ence. 
(2) At the conference, the administrator may require the parties to: 
(a) identify which allegations are admitted and which allegations are 
denied; 
(b) submit a joint statement detailing: 
(i) stipulated facts that are not in dispute; 
(ii) the issues to be decided; and 
(iii) applicable laws and rules; 
(c) submit a list of witnesses, exhibits, and papers or other evidence 
that each party intends to offer as evidence; and 
(d) confer in an effort to resolve or settle the grievance. 
(3) At the conclusion of the prehearing conference,' the administrator may 
require the parties to prepare a written statement identifying: 
(a) the items presented or agreed to under Subsection (2); and 
(b) the issues remaining to be resolved by the hearing process. 
(4) The prehearing conference is informal and is not open to the public or 
press. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-405, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 18. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
67-19a-406. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved 
employee — Hearing before hearing officer — 
Evidentiary and procedural rules. 
(1) (a) The administrator shall employ a certified court reporter to record 
the hearing and prepare an official transcript of the hearing. 
(b) The official transcript of the proceedings and all exhibits, briefs, 
motions, and pleadings received by the hearing officer are the official 
record of the proceeding. 
(2) (a) The agency has the burden of proof in all grievances resulting from 
dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, reductions in 
force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position. 
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(b) The employee has the burden of proof in all other grievances. 
(c) The party with the burden of proof must prove their case by sub-
stantial evidence. 
(3) (a) The hearing officer shall issue a written decision within 20 working 
days after the hearing is adjourned. 
(b) If the hearing officer does not issue a decision within 20 working 
days, the agency that is a party to the grievance is not liable for any 
claimed back wages or benefits after the date the decision is due. 
(4) The hearing officer may: 
(a) not award attorneys' fees or costs to either party; 
(b) close a hearing by complying with the procedures and requirements 
of Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act; 
(c) seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if the evi-
dence raises questions about an employee's character, professional compe-
tence, or physical or mental health; 
(d) grant continuances according to board rule; and 
(e) decide questions or disputes concerning standing in accordance with 
Section 67-19a-301. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-406, enacted by Subsections (4)(d) and (4)(e); and made stylistic 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 19; 1991, ch. 101, § 7. changes and appropriate changes in phraseol-
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- ogy. 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted the Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
subdivision designation "(a)" in Subsection (4); came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
designated former Subsections (5) and (6) as Utah Const. Art. VI Sec. 25. 
present Subsections (4)(b) and (4)(c); added 
67-19a-407, Appeal to Career Service Review Board. 
(1) (a) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's deci-
sion on a grievance to the board if: 
(i) the appealing party files a notice of appeal with the administra-
tor within ten working days after the receipt of the decision or the 
expiration of the period for decision, whichever is first; and 
(ii) the appealing party meets the requirements for appeal estab-
lished in Subsection (2). 
(b) The appealing party shall submit a copy of the official transcript of 
the hearing to the administrator. 
(2) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on 
a grievance to the board only if the appealing party alleges that: 
(a) the hearing officer did not issue a decision within 20 working days 
after the hearing adjourned; 
(b) the appealing party is dissatisfied with the decision; 
(c) the appealing party believes that the decision was based upon an 
incorrect or arbitrary interpretation of the facts; or 
(d) the appealing party believes that the hearing officer made an erro-
neous conclusion of law. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-407, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 20. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
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67-19a-408. Career Service Review Board hearing — Evi-
dentiary and procedural rules. 
(1) The board shall: 
(a) hold a hearing to review the hearing officer's decision not later than 
30 days after it receives the official transcript and the briefs; 
(b) review the decision of the hearing officer by considering the official 
record of that hearing and the briefs of the parties; and 
(c) issue its written decision addressing the hearing officer's decision 
within 40 working days after the record for its proceeding is closed. 
(2) In addition to whatever other remedy the board grants, it may order 
that the employee be placed on the reappointment roster provided for by 
Section 67-19-17 for assignment to another agency. 
(3) If the board does not issue its written decision within 40 working days 
after closing the record, the agency that is a party to the grievance is not 
liable for any claimed back wages or benefits after the date the decision is due. 
(4) The board may not award attorneys' fees or costs to either party. 
(5) The board may close a hearing by complying with the procedures and 
requirements of Title 52, Chapter 4, the Open and Public Meetings Act. 
(6) The board may seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if 
the evidence raises questions about an employee's character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-408, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 21. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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UTAH STATE INSURANCE 
DEPARTMENT, by and through 
its Commissioner and 
Authorized Representative, 
HAROLD C. YANCEY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 920900062CV 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The above captioned matter came on for hearing before 
this Court for oral argument on defendant's Motion to Dismiss the 
Amended Complaint on June 12, 1992, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
Plaintiff was represented by David H. Schwobe. Defendant was 
represented by Dan R. Larsen and Steven G. Schwendiman, Assistant 
Attorneys General. Having reviewed the memorandums and heard the 
arguments of counsel, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED 
as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint 
is granted for the reason that plaintiff has failed to exhaust 
- Id - 0123 
the administrative and statutory remedies for the review of 
grievance procedures. 
2. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed without 
prejudice. jfk 
DATED this JL day of 
DAVID Hf^ SCHWOBE / / 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
JflCHkRD/H. /MOFFAT i \? 1^£ J 
Third flistrj&t Coui^t , lJudge^>/ 
S & I I T LAKE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL, postage prepaid, this /£ 
day of y ///,?)f , 1992, to the following: 
David H. Schwobe 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
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343 South 400 East 
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Case No. J.H. 38 (1990) 
On May 11, 1990, Dawn Alumbaugh ("Grievant"), filed a request to advance her 
grievance, dated April 5, 1990, to the Step 5/evidentiary level of the State Employees' 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures. (Utah Code Ann. §§67-19a et seq.) Ms. Alumbaugh 
filed a timely request with the Career Service Review Board Office ("CSRB"). However, 
it is appropriate to examine and determine whether Grievant's April 5, 1990 grievance 
qualifies for advancement beyond the level of the department head at Step 4 of the 
Grievance Procedures. Consequently, this administrative review is being conducted pursuant 
to §67-19a-403(2), with particular reference to paragraphs (b)(ii) of the just-cited statutory 
section. 
BACKGROUND 
Grievant's original statement of grievance reads as follows: 
I had worked in my past position as a satisfied employee for 
6 years. My performance evaluations have all been satisfactory 
until our division received a new supervisor. Problems 
developed due to [me] not meeting [my] supervisor's 
expectations and not receiving adequate training. I informed 
her supervisor of the problems [that] I was experiencing and he 
informed me that he sympathized with my situation and would 
talk to the Personnel Director about a solution. He did ask 
[me] if I wanted to talk with her but realizing the consequences, 
I opted not to. 
Grievant then continued her statement of grievance on an accompanying sheet of paper, 
most of which constitutes Ms. Alumbaugh's version of how she came to be transferred from 
a position in the Insurance Department's ("Department") Solvency and Surveillance Division 
("Solvency Division") to another position, one which is in the Market Conduct Division. 
Grievant further stated: "I was not given the opportunity to meet performance standards 
Exhibit "A nn/17 
Tfa my previous position, as there weje none writien as a guideline for me to follow and 
meet" Additionally, Ms. Alumbaugh asserted that management had failed to comply with 
Department of Human Resource Management's ("DHRM") rule R468-10-2(l). This rule 
states that: 'The supervisor shall discuss the substandard performance with the employee in 
an attempt to discover the reasons therefore and set forth an appropriate written plan." 
Grievant claims that management failed to fully comply with this rule prior to her position 
transfer. Ms. Alumbaugh concluded her statement of grievance by writing: !II want to make 
it clear that I am grieving the way this administrative action was handled, as if proper steps 
would have been administered, I would have had the opportunity to make adjustments in 
my performance to meet expectations of the position." 
Moreover, Grievant stated her remedy or relief as follows: "Desk Audit to Insurance 
Technician II, Grade 17. Damages for emotional distress, embarrassment. Equal 
consideration for salary upgrades in the future." 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
The undersigned has determined that an administrative review of the record (i.e., 
case file) is sufficient to reach a determination on the jurisdictional issues at 
§67-19a-403(2)(a). The following pieces of correspondence adequately represent the 
positions of the Grievant and management: 
Grievance and attachment, dated April 5 
Step 2 Reply, Vanna Hunter to Dawn Alumbaugh, dated April 19 
Employee Performance Review for Grievant, dated April 6 
Grievant to Undersigned, dated April 12 
Step 3 Reply, Lennard Stillman to Grievant, dated April 20 
Grievant to Harold Yancey, dated April 17 
Step 4 Reply, Harold Yancey to Grievant, dated May 10 
Appeal to Step 5, Grievant to Undersigned, dated May 11 
The file record also contains several other documents, which are not germane to the 




grievance to Step 5. 
FINDINGS 
Concededly, there are some discrepancies with regard to the factual situation of when 
certain meetings were held and of the exact content or discussions that occurred. The 
undersigned has carefully examined the above-ciled documents. The following findings of 
fact represent this examiner's best efforts to sort out the factual background. Conceivably, 
there may indeed be some slight errors, but the overall substance is corroborated in the 
documents. 
1. The Department created a new Solvency Division in November 1989. 
Lennard Stillman was appointed as division director. Vanna Hunter was appointed to be 
a supervisor over one of the two sections within that division. Ms. Hunter was assigned to 
supervise Ms. Alumbaugh. The latter substantially continued with her same duties and 
responsibilities which she had performed prior to the reorganization, but there were also 
some new procedures and tasks assigned to her. ^
 0-r fi> a o rs* -><<*sC - /-'- /. " ^ v^'vt 
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2. According to Ms. Alumbaugh, she met with Mr. Stillman on February 20 and 
explained to him the problems f,[she] was having with the training practices [she] received 
under Ms. Hunter." Mr. Stillman placed this meeting in "approximately early March 1990." 
The discrepancy in dates is of minor import, and conceivably more than one meeting may 
have occurred. n<\ ^ o .-*>*/< I , \ » ^ T P - ^ ^ v J pA*r<> hz^^E-- £3^/£-S- /o-
3. Both Ms. Alumbaugh and Mr. Stillman concur that Grievant expressed some 
dissatisfaction with being supervised by Ms. Hunter. Mr. Stillman proposed finding another 
position in the Department for Grievant, and she agreed to his suggestion. Soon thereafter, 
Mr. Stillman discussed Grievant's dissatisfaction and problems with Olga Tsakakis, 
Personnel Coordinator/Director of Administrative Services. Ms. Tsakakis offered to 
evaluate the request of a reassignment for Ms. Alumbaugh. Ms. Tsakakis then considered 
the idea of reassigning two Insurance Tech 15 incumbents (Ms. Alumbaugh and 
3 
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rMs. Christcnsen) after she considered the skills and abilities of both women. Later, 
Ms. Tsakakis determined that it would be in the best interests of the Department to have 
Ms. Alumbaugh and Sandra Christensen each accept a mutual exchange of positions within 
the Department. Ms. Tsakakis then made the same recommendation to Commissioner 
Harold C. Yancey. 
4. On March 20, Commissioner Yancey met with the Grievant and discussed with 
Ms. Alumbaugh the prospect of a job-swap between her position and Ms. Christensen's 
position. The Commissioner's account of that meeting is that while Ms. Christensen wanted 
the weekend to "think it over," Ms. Alumbaugh made an "on-the-spot" decision to accept the
 MT^ -I. 
reassignment of positions. Mr. Stillman's account is similar in that he stated that while \>tt+'* ' 
Grievant would have liked to stay in the Solvency Division, Grievant also acknowledged that 
she "wouldjiccept a change irrespective of duties." A few days later, the Commissioner ^ ^ ^ > 
again met at length with Ms. Alumbaugh regarding the proposed transfer, which in fact, gave Tf\ ^^., 
her some additional time to think about the exchange. • 
5. There has been no showing of coercion with respect to Grievant's transfer. She ^c 
discussed the proposal beforehand with Commissioner Yancey, Mr. Stillman, and p « ^ " ' 
''/ 
undersigned that, "At no time did I ever request the action that Mr. Stillman referred to as ^ ^ 7 / 
a transfer." Ms. Alumbaugh's statement appears to be accurate; she did not raise the T H/-* 
transfer prospect, but Mr. Stillman did. However, there is no showing of evidence that she ^ 
objected to the prospect of a transfer, when she discussed it with Mr. Stillman, Ms. Tsakakis, f^rr & ^ r 
and Commissioner Yancey. The accounts by Commissioner Yancey and Mr. Stillman state
 r £ u ^ r 
that Grievant willingly and knowingly accepted the new assignment in the Market Conduct £p
 L^t\ 
Division. Regardless, even if Grievant had forthrightly objected to the change of duties and/ ^ ^ N" 
assignments between the two divisions, management has sufficient discretion to direct and Wofe
 n^{ 
control the work force>jndkidinj^^ duties and responsibilities as long as' ^ 
the assigned duties arjj^jihin.the.cojitex^^ minimum qualifications and 
the assigned work is within the scope of the appropriate DHRM class specification. (See 
Ms, Tsakakis according to three different accounts. Grievant wrote on April 17 to the \y/si 
DHRM R468-2-3 and R468-5-5.(5).) Indeed, the personnel action taken in the instant case 
- 1 9 . v , ^ . . a t « w ,„.„.,„ 
(alls within the ambit of both "Reassignment" as well as "Transfer" as those terms are 
defined in DHRM R468-1-1 Definitions. ^ ^ ^ _ ^ 
6. Grievant's now former supervisor, Ms. Hunter, did not initiate Grievant's transfer 
from the Solvency Division. Even if Ms. Hunter had wanted to transfer Grievant into the 
other division, she clearly lacked such authority. 
7. Grievant asserts that management violated DHRM R468-10-2.(l) by the 
supervisor (Ms. Hunter) not previously discussing substandard performance with Grievant 
prior to implementing the corrective action of a transfer under R468-10-2.(2)(d). However, 
there has been no showing that a Corrective Action Plan was either implemented or even 
contemplated at any time. Quite the contrary, Ms. Hunter's Step 2 reply and Mr. Stillman's 
Step 3 reply stated explicitly that no Corrective Action Plan had been implemented on 
Ms. Alumbaugh; nor does Commissioner Yancey's Step 4 reply mention such an action. 
As there was no implementation of a Corrective Action Plan, there could have been no 
violation of a rule pertaining to the implementation of a Corrective Action Plan, as claimed 
by Grievant. Cc&ttt-ri^t? ^ ^ ^ N , ^ M . V / . C ; i-fcuc- zz&s M / <-\ AL r/ ^-M-C D 
8. Ms. Alumbaugh received an employee performance review for the period 
October 1, 1989, though April 1, 1990, from Supervisor Hunter, which Grievant signed on 
April 9, 1990. This just-mentioned review evaluated Grievant's job performance as being 
overall satisfactory for the six months' period. Grievant received the review after she had 
transferred to her new position in the Market Conduct Division. Grievant claims that: 
(1) she was not given an opportunity to meet performance standards, (2) she did not receive 
adequate training guidelines prior to the transfer, and (3) that the evaluation was based 
upon a training period that lasted only approximately one month. By accepting a transfer 
outside of Supervisor Hunter's area of responsibility, Grievant's complaints on the 
evaluation process are moot although it was not inappropriate for management to evaluate 
Ms. Alumbaugh's performance for the period of work performed in the Solvency Division. 
Opportunity was afforded for Grievant to comment on the evaluation, which she did. 
DHRM R468-2-5.(3) also provides state employees with the opportunity to challenge, 
-J- °°51 
fcorrtci, or amend any information in the individual's personnel file. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Utah Code Annotated §67-19a-301 states: "Any career service employee may 
submit a grievance based upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression, including 
dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, omission, or condition for 
solution through the grievance procedures set forth in this chapter." Ms. Alumbaugh's 
grievance of April 5, 1990, falls within this ambit. 
2. §67-19a-302 states: 
(1) An aggrieved employee may grieve promotions, 
dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, 
salary, violations of personneJLr.ulcs, issues concerning the 
equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and 
disputes concerning abandonment of position to all levels of the 
grievance procedures. 
(2)(a) A career service employee may grieve all other 
matters only to the level of his department head. 
(b) The decision of the department head is final and 
unappealable to the board. 
The Career Service Review Board lacks jurisdiction to hear Grievant's gravamen at 
Step 5 of the Grievance Procedures, and Grievant lacks standing to process her grievance 
to Step 5 for an evidentiary hearing because her grievance does not comport with 
§67-19a-302(l). ~~ 
3. A complaint or grievance based upon the personnel action of a transfer or 
reassignment may not qualify on its face for advancement to the Step 5/evidentiary level of 
the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures; nor does §67-19a-302 permit 
grievances basedj^ jDryDerform^^ be advanced beyond Step 4. 
4. Furthermore, it is concluded that Grievant's requested remedies are inappropriate 
6 
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to the Grievance Procedures based on the following: 
(a) Requests for desk audits and all classification appeals are not within the 
scope of the Insurance Department, but require application to DHRM (§67-19-31 
and R468-4-5), nor do these matters come under the jurisdiction of the CSRB. 
(b) The CSRB lacks remedy powers over monetary awards for embarrassment 
and emotional distress. Such complaints may be petitioned through the general 
courts. The CSRB may not even award attorney's fees. (§67-19a-408(4).) 
(c) Any future salary increases are a prospective (future-oriented) matter, and 
the award or lack of award of future increases can only be treated at the time of 
occurrence. Grievant's requested remedy anent future salary increases is now 
premature. A grievance may always be filed coincident with any future award or the 
denial of an award on salary increase matters, but there is no present injury or harm 
cited in the instant grievance which may be treated at this lime. 
DECISION 
The instant grievance is hereby summarily dismissed from the docket of the Career 
Service Review Board with prejudice. (R140-1-16 F.) This ruling constitutes final agency 
action on this matter for purposes of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
§63-46b-14(3)(a). 
DATED this 21st day of May, 1990. 
Robert N. White 
Administrator 
Career Service Review Board 
For any judicial review of this Jurisdictional Decision and Summary Ruling, petition 
must be made within 30 days from the date of issuance with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
(§§63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16.) — ~ ~ 
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